Black Swan
I continue to think about black swans – not the movie. It’s a bit of a tautology to say that we can only identify them in hindsight, that is, we can only tell that an unexpected event will happen AFTER we’re caught off guard. The corollary to that is if we’re caught off guard, then it must have been a black swan event. I think investors and market participants often use that as an excuse. Continuing with that line of thinking, then, the implications for the pundit, writer, or talking head (or anyone not actively making decisions) is to try to mention as many possible events or outcomes as possible. Then, when one hits, the non-decision-maker can always say that he predicted it. In that light, prognosticators have a distinct motivation to talk about the possible, without thinking of the probable.
In contrast, decision makers often base their decisions on the probable. At its root, most institutional money managers don’t want to take any career risk, and “no one gets fired for buying IBM” (although, these days, maybe they get fired for buying HPQ). The idea behind this mentality is one of momentum, namely what’s happened in the recent past is likely to continue.
The last group – I guess you might know where this is going – looks at expected return. This last group are number crunchers at heart. I hope I fall into this camp more often than not. This group relies on SUMPRODUCT. The idea behind this group’s thinking is that you need to know both the possible outcomes AND the probability of each outcome. The expected return crowd is comfortable making appropriately sized investments given the expected outcome, recognizing full well that the expected outcome will deviate from the actual outcome in any given turn BY DEFINITION. The key for this group is that there is always a possibility that they/we don’t anticipate; except, you can anticipate the unanticipated by making an “other” category. This other category will now be factored in and will only be limited by the assumptions you input into it. Other, remember, can go in both direction. In essence, it’s a haircut. The more investors lump into the other category, the smaller they should trade.
I happen to have a lot of things in my “other” category. I worry about the weather. I think about terrorism. I think about supply shocks in every commodity imaginable. I think new technologies will revolutionize the way we live. And on and on. The implication is that I invest more conservatively than I would without my “other” category. I think a lot of people I speak to invest bigger than they should. Great when your PNL is going up. Hurts more on the way down. How big should you invest? Well, it probably depends how many things you think should be lumped into your “other” category.
In anticipation of the rebuttal, I’ll provide it myself… Fear, and especially fear of the unknown, can lead to inactivity. You might decide that so many things are unknown and in the “other” category, that your positions become miniscule, or even non-existent. In that scenario, you should also be afraid of inaction and indecision, and weigh that option. Against the risk of loss through action. You’ll probably find that inaction is worse.
In that light, our decision to hold cash, while simultaneously holding securities that would benefit from inflation might seem at odds. It is. It’s part of our inflation barbell strategy, namely in our analysis, inflation will EITHER increase or decrease, we’re just not sure yet which one. The one thing we’re pretty confident in, though, is that it won’t stay here very long. Food for thought as we move forward in our tactical allocation research.
Relevant ETFs: XLU, CROP, GLD, TBT





